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coverage to China and India; Latin
America and Africa also get attention.
However, the theme of these sections
seems to be impact rather than influence, and while that focus makes sense
for the argument he wants to make,
it does seem to divert attention away
from more-significant developments.
The individuals most responsible
for moving the Cold War away from
dangerous confrontation were Richard
M. Nixon and Leonid I. Brezhnev. Both
wanted détente, but for different reasons.
Westad argues that this period was
basically a truce. In many ways, détente
turned out to be much better for the
United States. The competition did not
go away, but it turned to soft power, in
which global trends ended up favoring
capitalism and the United States. Nixon
also managed to turn China into an ally
during this period. Westad argues that
this development occurred more because
of the incompetence of Mao Zedong as a
statesman than Nixon’s skills as a strategist. Mao had weakened China, and his
policies often brought about situations
that were exactly the opposite of what
he wanted. Rejecting the argument of
most historians, Westad argues that the
Americans rather than the Soviets killed
détente, mostly because of American
domestic politics. These arguments
are well sustained, and although many
might have trouble accepting these
contentions, they are basically correct.
Why did the Cold War end with a U.S.
victory? “Like its enemy, the United
States had its portion of Cold War
successes and failures. It is just that
the balance sheet came out differently,
and better, than that of the other side”
(p. 620). The assets that worked to the
advantage of the United States included
long-term alliances, economic growth
and transformations, technological
change, and diplomatic skill.
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This book is hardly the last word on the
Cold War; given its significance, the
period will be studied for decades to
come. But Westad has given his readers
an important, thought-provoking
account, and that is no small thing.
NICHOLAS EVAN SARANTAKES

Incidents at Sea: American Confrontation and Cooperation with Russia and China, 1945–2016, by
David F. Winkler. Annapolis, MD: Naval Institute
Press, 2017. 336 pages. $31.95.

In the summer of 1988, I stepped aboard
USS Yorktown (CG 48) as a young
midshipman during my orientation
cruise and noticed a ship silhouette
painted on the bridge wing. When
members of my class inquired about
its meaning, the crew regaled us with
the story of the shouldering incident
with the Russian frigate Bezzaventnyy
just a few months earlier in the Black
Sea—the incident pictured on the cover
of David F. Winkler’s recently updated
Incidents at Sea: American Confrontation
and Cooperation with Russia and China,
1945–2016. Winkler began studying
the 1972 Agreement on the Prevention
of Incidents on and over the High Seas
(also known as the Incidents at Sea
Agreement, or INCSEA) after experiencing such events firsthand as a junior
officer in the Sea of Japan in the mid1980s. Since then, he has established
himself as an authority on the subject at
the Naval Historical Foundation. With
a foreword by the chief U.S. negotiator
of INCSEA, former Secretary of the
Navy John W. Warner, this edition of
Winkler’s book builds on the original
(published in 2000) by addressing the
expanding influence of China and
the resurgence of Russia as global
competitors in the maritime domain.
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Incidents at Sea takes a chronological
approach to the intricate relationship
between the American and Russian
navies beginning at the end of World
War II, through the growth of the Soviet
navy, into the post–Cold War tensions
with Russia, to the emergence of China
as a global maritime force. Drawing
from oral histories and extensive
personal interviews, Winkler puts a
human face on these interactions by
relating the experiences of junior officers
aboard USN ships, senior naval leaders,
and senior government officials. He also
provides intimate details about the interactions of the members of the American
delegation with their Soviet counterparts
during the initial INCSEA negotiation
and subsequent annual reviews.
No single event precipitated this unprecedented agreement; instead a series
of dangerous, and sometimes deadly,
interactions between the two nations’
navies and air forces reached a tipping
point in 1971, resulting in a Soviet call
for action. American naval leaders had
sought such an agreement in the decade
prior, but senior State Department
officials were wary that these discussions
might derail ongoing American efforts
regarding territorial sea claims. Given
assurances from the Russians that this
would be a navy-only discussion, the
State Department acquiesced, and
then–Under Secretary of the Navy
Warner headed the U.S. negotiating
team for initial talks. After months of
preparation, the American delegation
went to Moscow in October 1971, and
the resulting agreement included all the
points it desired. A follow-on meeting in
Washington, DC, in March 1972 ironed
out remaining details, and Secretary
Warner signed the INCSEA agreement
with the Soviet navy’s commander in
chief, Fleet Admiral Sergey Gorshkov,
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on May 25, 1972, at President Richard
M. Nixon and Soviet leader Leonid
I. Brezhnev’s Moscow summit.
INCSEA marked the first formal
interaction between the two superpowers. Discussions involved more than just
negotiating sessions; they also included a
social agenda, with each side showcasing
the strengths of its culture and economy.
Winkler presents the social agenda
as a key element in the breakdown of
barriers between the two ideologically
different sets of participants. Another
key to INCSEA’s success was its bilateral
and navy-to-navy nature. Limiting the
scope of the agreement created more
common ground for the two parties.
Winkler notes something I also have
observed in bilateral navy staff talks:
naval officers have a common shared
experience of operating at sea that
cuts across the politics of nations.
Since the signing of the historic agreement, U.S.-Russian relations have ebbed
and flowed, but INCSEA remains a
stalwart of international agreement and
cooperation. Winkler illustrates how—
despite other sources of tension between
the two countries—both sides have
maintained civility during the annual
INCSEA reviews. He also describes several tense international situations during
which following INCSEA protocols kept
a cold war from turning hot. Yet despite
its success, INCSEA has not prevented
all unsafe interactions at sea—witness
the Bezzaventnyy-Yorktown incident
in February 1988. More recently, since
the Russian resurgence under President
Vladimir Putin, the number of incidents
between the two nations has increased,
especially as American warships and
aircraft reassert the right to navigate
freely in the Black and Baltic Seas.
The growth of the Chinese People’s
Liberation Army Navy in the 1990s
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brought increased interaction with
American warships, naval auxiliaries,
and military aircraft, reminiscent of
the Cold War. The United States and
China signed the Military Maritime
Consultative Agreement (MMCA) in
1998, modeled after INCSEA. Winkler
notes, however, that the MMCA lacks
the level of trust established between
the Soviet and American navies, and
therefore has been less effective.
The high seas and contested littorals
were the front line of U.S.-Soviet interaction during the Cold War. Winkler’s
book provides an intimate look at
the development and execution of a
landmark agreement between adversaries that provided a key mechanism
for ensuring that their interaction at
sea remained professional and kept
the Cold War from becoming hot.
JAMES P. MCGRATH III

The British Carrier Strike Fleet after 1945, by David Hobbs. Annapolis, MD: Naval Institute Press,
2015. 480 pages. $59.95.

This work is the latest in a series
of books from this author about
Royal Navy aircraft carriers, and British
carrier aviation in particular. It takes
the story forward from where his last
work on the British Pacific Fleet left
us—in the misty waters of Tokyo Bay
in September 1945. Hobbs shows how
the ethos of naval strike warfare that
had been developed and honed in the
rigors of World War II survived the
many and varied challenges that the
postwar era threw at it. Most obviously,
perhaps, it is a study of naval retrenchment under that most demanding of
scenarios: demobilization after a world
war coupled with a broader and ongoing
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retreat from global preeminence. It is
no surprise, then, that budgetary issues
take center stage, but Hobbs manages
to make his account much more than
a mere litany of what might have been.
He charts moments of gritty determination and ingenuity mixed with some
unforgivable and almost criminal areas
of waste and abuse—features that are
certainly familiar to anyone involved in
military planning. Above all, though,
an unswerving belief from within the
service about the value of its aviation has
allowed the capability to be resurrected
almost from the dead in recent years,
in the form of two large carriers with
real strike capability. This fact alone
makes this book a compelling read.
It is difficult to imagine a more qualified
individual than Hobbs to guide us
through this story. After a thirty-year
naval career as an aviator that spanned
the last years of the “big deck” carriers,
the “through-deck” cruiser era, and
right up to the “renaissance” after the
Falklands War, Hobbs capped this off
with a period working in naval records
and as the curator of the Fleet Air Arm
Museum. This gave him almost unparalleled access to the necessary archival
material, a resource he has used to
great effect in this volume. The book is
nothing short of exacting in its research.
That said, and although he tries valiantly
to hide it, Hobbs clearly has a message
he is anxious to communicate. It is, as he
freely admits, “in part my own story” (p.
vii). His thesis, which he openly reveals
in the last few pages, is that Britain
would have been better served had it
continued to replace its strike carriers
from the 1960s onward. While an understandable and legitimate viewpoint,
it is just that—a viewpoint—and many
will bemoan this lack of objectivity,
particularly as the broader constraints
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